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# Retirement Policy and the Directorate of Intelligence

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31 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Retirement Policy

This report is an amalgam of fact, opinion and judgment about Agency retirement policy and practice. Its purpose is to provide background on how that policy has affected personnel of the Intelligence Directorate, ascertain whether recent policy changes--resulting in the removal of personnel from our roles sooner than had earlier been anticipated--affects operations adversely or beneficially, and, to submit for management consideration changes in policy flowing from this analysis.

The cardinal supports of sound personnel policy are few in number. A challenging assignment worth the doing guarantees job satisfaction. Fair day's pay for fair day's work enables the employee to meet the economic obligations of his station in life. In the choice of how long to extend his work life lies the reward of flexibility in planning the use of the years which follow.

This then is what retirement policy is about: the later years for which the first were made.

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Special Advisor

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## CONCLUSIONS

The more strict application of Agency retirement policy, and its recent change resulting in the acceleration of retirement for many, has given us greater flexibility in managing resources and brought new blood in key posts. Managers have found it easier to accommodate to the demands of personnel reductions, reorganizations and reprogramming.

The cost to managers has been the loss alike of personnel who could have continued in particularly useful service and personnel whose ability to contribute had leveled off.

Employee morale has suffered, especially among those called upon to retire a good deal earlier and with a good deal less service than they had planned.

In effect, the general use of early retirement is serving as a substitute for the more difficult management job of selectively separating from service those no longer effective.

572 retirements are scheduled over the next ten years under present Agency policy. Of these 222 can accelerate their own retirements because they will have met the 55/30 or the 50/20 age/service combination before their scheduled retirement dates. An additional 316 will likewise be eligible but will not reach age 60 during the ten year period.

All of these are uniformly distributed over the next ten years. No undue numbers are scheduled to leave any single office. Departures by grade are well distributed. The retirement dates of office directors and deputies are with few exceptions well into the future and well spaced.

The most immediate problem is to view sympathetically extensions which may be requested by individuals among the 126 who had their retirement dates accelerated--up to two years--on very short notice as career planning goes.

Requests for extensions for cause can continue to be made under [REDACTED] and under the Director's approved policy statement enjoining that the

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"implementation of the revised Civil Service Retirement policy be phased gradually over the next two years with liberal exceptions to give full consideration to its impact on individuals with less than 30 years service who might have reasonably expected to continue in employment until age 62."

[D/PERS memo for DCI 27 Jan 67]

The questionable practice of stressing financial hardship as major grounds for grudgingly granting extensions should be discontinued. How much money a man's wife has is not sound reason for determining the tenure of his employment.

We should develop a management climate which will make the employee's last years in the Agency the best of his career. These last years will color his entire outlook as an alumnus of this Agency--and we do need a strong alumni to help guarantee our future.

A long term problem of some moment will not be materially affected by any likely changes in retirement policy. Its roots lie in the fact that by 1978 virtually every DDI employee now on board and still on board then will have earned 30 years service by age 55. There is no reliable way to say now what conditions will be, or whether it will by then be accepted practice to retire as early as possible. It may be that the shoe will be on the other foot. We may be searching for ways to retain people instead of how to make them go. On the other hand maybe 50 years will then be the magic number 60 is today.

Means should be found for restoring to managers flexibility in granting extensions for the operational convenience of their offices. Arrangements should also be made to extend the work life of outstanding employees beyond the normally accepted date of retirement.

As long as the Agency generally adheres to Civil Service standards in the management of personnel not members of the CIA Retirement System, the retirement options left to these employees should be equal to or better than any available under Civil Service.

This does not mean identical in every respect. It does mean that if, in the interest of the general management of the Agency, the employee is to be denied the option of working until a given age, he should in some way be compensated

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for this in order to maintain parity with his counterpart in another Government agency. Such compensation might, for example, be in the form of a separation allowance, or a credit to his retirement account for annuity service foregone, or providing at no cost to the employee insurance for a term and at a level equivalent to what would have been available to him had he not been retired.

There are economic as well as policy grounds for compensating the employee for prospective loss of earnings and annuity. The earlier people with considerable seniority are retired, the lower the Agency's per capita salary costs. Why should the Agency not share this gain with the employee?

A liberalization of the normal retirement age in the DDI would not only preserve human assets, it would bring us more in line with accepted retirement practice elsewhere. Private organizations and the academic community in particular have given the employee an option to retire early while leaving him the decision of continuing beyond 60 if he chooses.

Alternatively, there is much to recommend broadening the membership of the present CIA Retirement System to include all (or all professional) employees, though not necessarily under identical retirement provisions. This would be consistent with Administration policy as recently expressed in the President's Cabinet Report on Retirement. It is consistent with Congressional opinion. It is a natural evolution of Agency policy that has to date virtually eliminated the differences in retirement under the CIA and the Civil Service systems.

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### RECOMMENDATIONS

That DDI urge a policy which provides for:

normal retirement at age 62 with 20 years or more of service;

terminating by other devices the employ of personnel who cease to be productive at 60 or earlier;

offering selected outstanding employees an opportunity to extend beyond age 62 up to age 65.

That DDI seek to establish a climate of management concern for employees nearing retirement age to the end of creating a reservoir of goodwill toward the Agency among its alumni.

That DDI support an Agency undertaking to conduct a study of the feasibility of a single Agency-wide retirement system.

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## RETIREMENT POLICY AND THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

### INTRODUCTION

This study addresses the problem of how the Agency's retirement policy affects the Directorate of Intelligence.

The particular objective has been to assess the impact of the early retirement policy adopted by the Director nearly a year ago following legislation which liberalized retirement under Civil Service. Two related questions were considered basic:

Is the accelerated departure of early retirees from operating components occasioned by recent policy changes beneficial or detrimental to the DDI mission?

What significant reaction has the policy engendered among the employees themselves?

The approach used was to look at the record, to study the pattern of retirements scheduled for the years ahead, to seek formally the views of our managers, to ascertain informally how the employees themselves viewed the matter and to note trends elsewhere that might color the attitudes of prospective employees or in some way penalize us.

A word about definitions. The lexicon used by the Agency in discussing retirement in its directives has led to uncertainty--if not resulted in purposeful ambiguity--of interpretation. To avoid misunderstanding, I have selected the words "scheduled" and "eligible" to distinguish between the retirement dates of prime importance.

The scheduled retirement date refers to the date on which the employee is to retire by force of Agency policy. By contrast, when referring to the date on which an employee (because he meets a prescribed combination of age and service) may exercise his legal right to retire, the term eligible is used.

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Thus John Doe is eligible to retire in 1968 because he has 30 years of service, will attain age 55, and the law says he may. However, he is scheduled to retire in 1973 because he will by then have more than 20 years service, reach age 60, and Agency policy is that he shall.

Reports on retirement often are incomplete because Agency employees belong to one of two retirement systems, the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARS). Reporting on these systems is usually kept separate, though most components have personnel in both systems.

From the manager's viewpoint, he is less concerned under which system an employee will be retired as he is when he may or will be deprived of the employee's services. This report covers the operation of policies under both systems. Thus if the retirement condition (51/20) finds its way next to 61/20, neither is likely to be typographic error. Where it has been important to distinguish between the two systems, this has been done.

Basic charts have been included immediately following for orientation and in order to assist the reader to place the detailed findings in context. These include a profile of the DDI population (how many people we have in each age group), an organization chart (how functions have been assigned and command relationships), and the table of organization (how professional and clerical positions have been allocated to the various DDI components).

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# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DDS&T

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

BOARD AND OFFICE  
OF  
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

ADMIN, EXEC, &  
PLANNING STAFFS

OVERSEAS  
REPRESENTATIVES

INFORMATION  
REQUIREMENTS STAFF

OPERATIONS  
CENTER

SPECIAL  
RESEARCH STAFF

COMIREX  
STAFF

STATSPEC

OSI

FMSAC

OFFICE OF  
BASIC AND  
GEOGRAPHIC  
INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF  
CURRENT  
INTELLIGENCE

DOMESTIC  
CONTACT  
SERVICE

NATIONAL  
PHOTOGRAPHIC  
INTERPRETATION  
CENTER

OFFICE OF  
ECONOMIC  
RESEARCH

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STRATEGIC  
RESEARCH

CENTRAL  
REFERENCE  
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## DIRECTORATE RETIREMENT RECORD

Over the last six years, Agency early retirement policy has been increasingly more strictly applied. This has resulted in a rise in the number of separations from the Directorate of Intelligence\* through retirement of one form or another.

During this six year period, disability cases aside, 110 were retired, varying from a low of one in fiscal 1962 to a high of 38 in 1967.

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Even the figure of 38 is not an impressive figure when compared with the total movement out. The attrition of DDI personnel runs at 400 per year (200 professionals leaving at [REDACTED] 200 clericals leaving at [REDACTED]).

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In considering the retirement problem, individuals in which we are most interested are those in the over age 40 group. Within ten years some of these become eligible for retirement under the CIA retirement system. Also, there is a notion that not many people leave as they get into their forties and fifties. This is quite wrong.

In the period 1962-1967, separations from the over age 40 group totaled 367, of which 167 were retirees. Averaged out the picture looks like this:

<u>Cause of separations</u>	<u>Annual average</u>
Deaths	5
Resignations	28
Retired for disability	9
Retired as surplus	1
Retired under CIA system	2
Retired under Civil Service	16
Total annual separations	61

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\*For purposes of analysis, the strength of the Directorate of Intelligence may be taken [REDACTED] By Office of Personnel occupational titles, [REDACTED] are professional, [REDACTED] technical, [REDACTED] communications and [REDACTED] clerical employees. The more customary division, the result of putting most of the GS-7s and lower grades in the clerical ranks, shows [REDACTED] professionals and [REDACTED] clericals.

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By the end of the period separations from the over 40 group were running 80 per year (60 professionals and 20 clerical), of which nearly 40 were retired for disability or age or as surplus.

Now retirement results from one of two actions. An employee retires because he has been induced or forced by management to do so for specific or general reasons. Or he exercises free choice after having earned the right to retire by attaining a certain combination of age and years of service. The increases in DDI retirements have largely been the result of management induced retirements rather than employee election.

With an increase in the number of employees scheduled for early retirement has come an increase in requests for extensions, generally on grounds of financial hardship.

In calendar 1967, 38 people from seven DDI components were scheduled to retire. Of these 20 retired on schedule and 18 were granted extensions by the Director on recommendation of the CIA Retirement Board. Many of these extensions were for short periods of time, four being for six or less months. The average extension was 12 months, a period which the Board prefers not to exceed except for compelling reasons.

The average age of those requesting extensions was 62.7, with a range of 60-68. Years of service earned for this group were 21.6, with a range of 10-40. Grades varied from GS-5 to GS-18, with ten out of the 38 cases being GS-13/14s.

From management's point of view, retirements have progressed in an orderly way. Extensions granted have been almost without exception in keeping with the spirit of the policy and regulations.

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## PROJECTED RETIREMENTS

For whatever planned or fortuitous combination of circumstances, projected retirements in the DDI surface no problems arising from bunching. Retirements scheduled under Agency policy are uniformly distributed over the next ten years, as are the potential retirements through eligibility because of age/service combinations attained. No great exodus from a single office poses a threat. Nor is the departure of talent as measured by grades in uncommon quantities in a given time apparent.

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Of the [REDACTED] employees now on board, 888 of them will either be scheduled or become eligible to retire in the next ten years, or both:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	
	<u>Scheduled</u>	<u>Eligible</u>
1968	53	53
1969	63	16
1970	46	23
1971	55	45
1972	47	72
Subtotal	264	209
1973	52	56
1974	69	55
1975	69	69
1976	56	69
1977	62	80
Subtotal	308	329
Total ten years	572	538*

\*Of these, 222 become eligible before being scheduled for retirement. This leaves 316 who will also become eligible but who will not be scheduled because they do not attain age 60 before 1978. Hence total scheduled or eligible in period 1968-1977 is 572 plus 316 or 888.

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The distribution of the 572 employees scheduled to retire according to grade follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Grade Group</u>		
		<u>Under GS-12</u>	<u>GS 13-15</u>	<u>GS 16-18</u>
1968	53	28	20	5
1969	63	38	23	2
1970	46	23	23	
1971	55	31	21	3
1972	47	25	19	3
1973	52	30	17	5
1974	69	37	30	2
1975	69	41	22	6
1976	56	34	19	3
1977	62	35	21	6
STATSPEC	572	322	215	35

Of the 888 employees, 802 are presently under the Civil Service Retirement System and 86 under the CIA Retirement System, though this will change over the years as some, particularly [REDACTED] qualify for the CIA system.

#### Civil Service System

<u>Status</u>	<u>Number of employees</u>
Will be over 60 on scheduled date	103
Scheduled under 60/20 and will have insufficient service to elect to leave earlier	243
Scheduled under 60/20 but will have sufficient service to leave before 60 under 55/30 option	193
Total scheduled under Civil Service	539
Not scheduled in period but eligible under 55/30 option	263
Total Civil Service	802

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CIA Retirement System

<u>Status</u>	<u>Number of employees</u>
Will be 60 or over on retirement	4
Scheduled at 60 but eligible to leave before 60 under 50/20 option	<u>30</u>
Total scheduled under CIA system	34
Not scheduled but eligible under 55/20 option	<u>52</u>
Total CIA system	<u>86</u>

Of the 436 employees either scheduled or eligible to retire over the next five years (calendar 1968-1972), 281 professional and 90 clerical employees are in the Civil Service System, and 65, all professional, are in the CIA system.

A projection of key DDI executives, that is, the directors and deputies of the operating components shows retirements well into the future and well spaced. About one third of these officials will have earned a right to retire before their scheduled date, with option to accelerate their retirement from one year up to ten.

Projected Executive Retirement  
By Year Scheduled or (Eligible)

<u>Component</u>	<u>Director</u>	<u>Position</u> <u>Deputy</u>
OCI	1981	1983
OER	1973 (1972)	1983
OSR	1986	1984
OBTI	1973 (1968)	1975 (1971)
NPIC	1975 (1972)	1985
IAS	1986	1972
CRS	1975 (1972)	1981
DCS	1977 (1976)	1971
STATSPEC	1968	1980 (1970)
ONE	1968	1973

Note: Director OCS/DDS&T, a DDI careerist, is scheduled to retire in 1986, but will become eligible for optional retirement in 1981.

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## POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS

Early retirement policy enforcement has created a number of special problems. Some have matured and already are decreasing in importance. The full force of others, more long range in their implications, has yet to be felt.

### Acceleration of Previously Scheduled Retirement Dates

One of the short term problems stems from the impact of early retirement on the group of employees who got very little notice of the change in policy making it necessary to retire at 60 rather than 62.

In the DDI, 126 employees had their retirement dates accelerated by amounts varying up to two years. For some employees this was the third time in less than 12 years that they were given a new retirement date, each earlier than the previous one.

In some cases, from every point of view (except perhaps ease of doing the necessary arithmetic) there was little need to change the retirement date at all. For example, 17 employees had the dates moved up six months or less. To what end, except to upset people? The retirement of another 24 was accelerated less than a year. This group has naturally sought relief through extensions. A plea of inadequate notice should have sufficed as grounds for extension although in some cases lack of demonstrable financial hardship made it uncertain that the application could even be considered.

At the other end of the spectrum, 51 employees had their careers abbreviated a full two years, ten of these being scheduled to retire in 1969, another 20 in 1970.

Grade-wise the group varied from GS-4 to GS-17, with over half in the GS-12/15 bracket.

The point is, in career and family planning, anything short of five years' notice should be considered inadequate when a unilaterally imposed management change in job tenure is being contemplated.

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Quite another problem from management's viewpoint is the uncertainty surrounding the time of departure of employees whose service gives them a right to retire well in advance of their scheduled retirement date. Now that age 60 is the Agency's normal retirement age, the gap between scheduled and eligible dates can be as much as five years (age 55) for those under Civil Service and ten years (age 50) for those under the CIA system.

We have only limited evidence on the probable effect of the more liberal provisions of the recent Civil Service legislation. In FY 1966, when a penalty attached to anyone with 30 years service leaving at age 55, 7,400 individuals exercised this option throughout the Federal Government. That year a total of 77,900 people retired (average age 61.3, average service 24.9). The 55/30 group constituted 10% of total retirees and 34% of those retiring optionally by age 60:

<u>Option</u>	<u>Number Retirees</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Service</u>
55/30	7,400	58.1	34.6
60/30	14,400	65.0	37.2

By contrast, in FY 1967, under the more liberal provisions which removed the early retirement penalty, 48,700 people retired (average age 59.9, average service 22.6). The proportion of this lower figure made up by the 55/30 retirees was about the same, slightly up to 10.3%. However, they accounted for 57% of those who retired optionally by age 60 compared to 34% the previous year.

<u>Option</u>	<u>Number Retirees</u>	<u>Average Age</u>	<u>Average Service</u>
55/30	5,000	57.6	33.4
60/20	3,600	61.4	24.7

Comparative Agency statistics for the last three calendar years follow:

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## Civil Service Retirement System

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1965</u>
Optional (55/30)	17	) 84	) 134
Mandatory	78	)	)
Disability	40	47	53
Discontinued service	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>14</u>
	142	135	201

## CIA Retirement System

Voluntary (50/20)	42	28	22
Mandatory	10	16	15
Disability	12	1	2
Discontinued service	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	65	45	39

A word of explanation is necessary to account for the large exodus both in the Government generally and in CIA during 1965. Any time a liberalizing provision is introduced in retirement legislation, a backlog of people elect to take advantage of its benefits, particularly when they are given a deadline within which to act.

Thus many people, including many in CIA, decided to retire in December 1965 to take advantage of a 6.1% increase in annuity offered by the Government to those who retired prior to 1966. Similarly, some have already taken advantage of the more liberal 55/30 and 60/20 options.

Based on trends in the Government generally, the number of people electing to retire under the 55/30 Civil Service option will probably run between 70% and 100% over previous retirements under that option. The number going out under the 60/20 option will probably not exceed the 12% previously averaged by the 62/12 group.

As we have noted earlier, 538 DDI people will over the next ten years become eligible to retire either under the 55/30 Civil Service option or the 50/20 CIA system option. 222 of the 538 will also be scheduled to retire within the period.

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A reasonable estimate is that as time goes on a moderately increasing number of these will elect to retire under the 55/30. Last year, those retiring early were about 25% of scheduled retirements. We have seen that the 55/30s last year accounted for 57% of optional retirements by age 60 in the Government generally, but only 10% of all retirees. Our projection shows that over the ten years our early retirees cannot exceed 94% of those scheduled because 572 are scheduled during the period when 538 will become eligible.

A reasonable estimate for planning purposes is that on an average about 25% of those eligible under Civil Service exercise their 55/30 option to leave early, with the figure rising to 30-35% over the next ten years.

If we look at probable retirements under the 50/20 option of the CIA system, the proportion of early departures is likely to be a good deal higher.

We saw above that in 1967, 42 retirements under the CIA system were voluntary (eligible) compared to ten that were mandatory (scheduled). And only one was the result of the exercise by management of its option to retire an employee involuntarily for the good of the service (the first, incidentally, in the three years the system has been in operation).

It is not improbable that over the years it will come to be accepted practice for those in the CIA system to retire at age 50 unless they feel they are really going somewhere. Though the Director's consent is required for these early departures, this consent has to date never been withheld, and may well come to be considered more a matter of form than substance.

STATSPEC  
This is much more likely than is retirement under Civil Service at age 55. At 50 a man has sufficient time for an entire second career. With the economic security of 40% of his salary guaranteed for life, he will leave in order "to do what I have always wanted to without undue sacrifice or risk to my family." We should therefore be particularly mindful of trends in this direction [REDACTED] which presently accounts for 65 of the 86 DDI members of the CIA system. And 39 of these 65, all professionals, will have an option to retire before 1978 and before reaching age 60. This is likely to be a costly program indeed.

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### Employee Morale

Unquestionably employee morale has suffered, because the need for early retirement has never been made clear in many DDI components, and because unanticipated changes in signals have upset future plans. While relatively few people are immediately and directly affected, they are the older hands, often in key jobs, and their attitudes color the atmosphere beyond what their number would suggest.

Looking ahead the problem is a bit different. An employee may be sufficiently far away from retirement that he remains neutral in any controversy about retirement policy. As he gets older, however, even if he has accumulated a healthy service record, he will increasingly resent the fact that his freedom of choice in deciding his own future has been curtailed, while that of his counterpart in other agencies has not.

This would be particularly true in cases of personal difficulty. As someone has said, a striking characteristic of the human condition is the discrepancy between aspiration and opportunity. As he nears 60, many an employee finds the gap wide and widening.

The very existence of two systems in the Agency makes more difficult the employee's acceptance of his minority status in Civil Service. The manner in which the CIA system is operated--criteria for deciding who shall qualify for retirement thereunder for example--makes it increasingly apparent that the form of membership in a given career service outweighs the substance of doing a given job.

Thus he feels discriminated against in two ways. Looking internally he sees another--in his mind no more deserving than he--given membership in the preferential CIA Retirement System. Looking externally, he sees his Civil Service counterpart free to decide when he shall retire.

### Agency Image

How much the Agency's internal policy on retirement may affect its image by the outside world is certainly open to question. A good case can probably be made that there is no causal relationship between these two things.

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A more prudent view is to recognize that whatever the magnitude of its effect, a discriminatory retirement policy will impact adversely on the Agency's image. The impact may be little at a time and it may be slow. The effects are, however, likely to be cumulative. There are two related sources of potential trouble. One the retiree, back in his new life outside the Agency after a career of some years in it. The other the potential recruit, looking at all aspects of each job offer before deciding to jump.

A very small sampling of Agency retiree opinion indicated strong and unanimous views that Agency policy of early retirement results in a waste of accumulated knowledge, experience and know-how. These retirees, from grades GS-13 to GS-18, recognized the theory of making room for younger men, etc., but thought this did not compensate for the loss of accumulated experience, some obtained by the Agency at considerable expense. Chronological age, they felt, was not a proper measure of ability to continue effective output and management.

Query: if our alumni feel our retirement policy is poor, how much can we count upon them for support when they advise young people about career opportunities in the Agency?

As to the potential recruits themselves. Our reading is that many are keenly interested in knowing about the retirement system just as they are about all fringe benefits. The CIA early retirement system permitting retirement at age 50 with 20 years service is a tremendous inducement. The idea of retirement at 55 with 30 years service under Civil Service is much less attractive. It is made even less so when option to work beyond 60 if he should choose is denied.

The prospective recruit may of course not be aware of this latter point. Recruiting brochures used by the Agency today as in 1952 contain reassuring prose about the enjoyment by CIA employees of the benefits of Civil Service Retirement.

#### "When You Retire

Generally, CIA employees are eligible for benefits under the Civil Service Retirement Act. It will be to your advantage to become acquainted with the retirement system and understand the various benefits that it

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provides. Details and rate tables are contained in the 'Certificate of Membership in the U.S. Civil Service Retirement System.' Standard Form 105, which you received when you reported for duty. For further information consult the Personnel Relations office."

[CIA Brochure dated July 1952]

#### "Conditions of Employment

CIA employees enjoy benefits and privileges generally equivalent to Federal Civil Service employment, such as membership in a retirement system...even though they are exempt from Civil Service."

[CIA Brochure currently in use]

This can mislead. If it does the Agency does not stand to benefit from it.

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### MANAGER'S VIEWPOINT

Any retirement policy must serve the ends of management--those to whom the achievement of the organizational purpose has been entrusted. To an unusual degree the DDI manager is dependent upon people to carry out his responsibilities.

How has this manager--the office director, the office deputy director, the senior line chief--reacted to Agency retirement policy? Specifically, as policy moves to deprive him of the services of a given individual at a given time, or to extend the time during which he will have to continue to rely on an individual, how has this manager reacted?

To sample this reaction, the views of the office directors themselves were sought.

It was pointed out to them that close to 600 employees are scheduled to retire over the next ten years, and that some 400 of these are professional employees. Moreover, that some of these as well as an additional number could on their own decide to call it quits before reaching age 60.

The importance of assessing the effect of these prospective departures on operations, and of planning anticipatory action designed to keep the Directorate strong was stressed.

As a first step, each prospective retiree was identified. Managers were asked to make judgments concerning his contribution and the availability of a replacement.

A judgment was then made of the probable need for his services beyond the scheduled date of retirement. Considerations influencing this judgment included:

- . Availability of competent replacement.
- . Whether his skills are in short supply or are surplus.
- . Whether he is blocking others from normal expectation of advancement.
- . Whether his departure would facilitate adjustment to new programs.

SECRET

- . Whether his departure would facilitate adjustment to reduction in strength.
- . Whether age or outlook have diminished his ability to contribute.
- . Trade-offs of his retirement at 60 with the cost of training his replacement.

The results of this exercise may be summarized as follows:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Individuals Assigned</u>
-----------------	---------------------------------------

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| I. Individuals which the office head would particularly desire to retain beyond the presently scheduled date of retirement:   |  |
| II. Individuals for whom the office head could not justify an extension on the basis of operational necessity, but if one were granted by higher authority on other grounds, he would welcome it as benefiting the office materially: |  |
| III. All things considered, and recognizing the continuing usefulness of most of these individuals, the office head would prefer to see them retire as scheduled:   |  |

25X9

Individuals were placed in categories I and II for a number of reasons. Some have skills not qualitatively replaceable to the degree of present performance. Some are needed to meet an unusual training problem. Some are uniquely capable in their present job. Their departure would reduce the cost effectiveness of the office. Others still should be extended in order to facilitate the most orderly management of the office.

STATSPEC



Another and more immediate situation is presented by NPIC and IAS. Much of the professional force of those components is very young and very new. Apart from heavy workloads, the expansion of recent years has put an unusual burden upon the experienced hands to train the newer ones. Because of outside competition for like skills turnover is high. Timely extensions granted to even a few would help a good deal.

The basis for seeking extensions for others, in OER and OBGI for example, will simply be to prolong the unusually valuable substantive contribution to the output of the office. Many intelligence officers will sustain their ability to contribute importantly to the work of their offices well beyond age 60. While managers see no compelling need to extend a proficient or even a strong performer, they feel that the services of an outstanding performer should one way or another be retained at least until 62 and perhaps, in exceptional cases, even beyond.

Some offices applied very strict standards. CRS, for example, plans to seek no exceptions on operational grounds. CRS was influenced heavily by the relatively long average length of service of its employees and the beneficial effects of well ordered turnover in the higher positions to facilitate adjustment to new ways and new levels of operation. OCI choices for extension were among those particularly competent in their present assignments and whose classification was based upon their retention in those jobs, or for a specified time.

The length of extensions likely to be sought varied from six months to indefinite. One to two years would satisfy most situations, unless the passage of time makes matters worse rather than better in terms of the ability of the office to accommodate to change.

The attitudes of office directors were also obtained on a related matter, and found to be consistent with their views on early retirement policy. This had to do with the group of employees fairly close to retirement when the policy was changed. The prospective job tenure of 126 employees was curtailed when, as a result of the new policy, their retirement dates were accelerated anywhere from one to 24 months.

On the assumption that there had been inadequate notice, office directors were queried whether relief should be sought for the group as a whole.

Without exception, they urged that no group extensions be granted, but that appeals be left to employee initiative for consideration by the Retirement Board on an individual case basis.

The conclusions to be drawn from this exercise are:

- . Managers like early retirement.
- . They would like more flexibility in administering the policy in a local situation of limited duration.
- . They plan to seek very few exceptions.
- . The exceptions sought will be for relatively short periods and for pressing reasons only.
- . If, at the employee's initiative, extensions are granted on compassionate or other grounds, managers will in most cases be able to adjust and continue to make effective use of the individual.

25X1A

Because the average age and grade runs relatively high in the field offices [REDACTED] a sampling of the views of the office chiefs was taken. Their views were remarkably consistent with those of the office directors, the consensus being:

- . Stick to the present policy, but allow greater flexibility in administering the policy in individual cases, particularly where the employee was hired in

mid-career when a much more liberal retirement policy was in force.

- . Operational convenience rather than necessity should suffice to justify extensions beyond retirement date.
- . Early retirement rules need not necessarily apply to clerical and other subprofessional support personnel.
- . Use of employees in postretirement status is no satisfactory alternative to an extension. (WAE personnel can be used only half time, and cannot be placed in supervisory roles.)

### EMPLOYEE'S VIEWPOINT

Employee attitude toward retirement and reaction to retirement policy is important. Precisely because people make up virtually our entire list of assets, we must be particularly sensitive to employee morale and recruitment incentives.

No formal survey was undertaken to sample employee reaction to retirement policy. Considerable evidence is nevertheless available. This has been gathered by supervisors, by administrative and personnel officers, by members of the CIA Retirement Board and its support units. Some of this evidence was obtained through letters and conversations integral to the formal processing of specific retirement cases or the establishment of new dates on which employees were expected (scheduled) to retire. Other evidence, perhaps the most meaningful, was surfaced much more informally--the telephone call, the conversation over lunch or in the corridors which remain the true barometric reading of any organization.

Quite naturally those most concerned are to be found among the group nearing retirement age. In contrast, many of the younger employees have given the matter no thought or have dismissed it lightly. Even among the older employees there are a number who have shown no particular concern. They have had many years of service and their early retirement plans of long standing have not been adversely affected by the recent change in retirement policy.

Among concerned employees--perhaps 10% - 20% in number--the causes of concern vary from a vague sense of injustice or confusion to a well-defined conviction that the Agency is acting immorally or illegally:

- o He has never been presented the case why early retirement was good for the Agency, the DDI, his shop or himself.

#### Example

"As a manager...I can see where retirement at age 55 or 60 will be very detrimental to the office.... If it can be demonstrated

that the 55/30 or 62/20 is the best program for the Agency to adopt, then I feel it should be put into effect in some gradual manner so that it would not work a hardship on those people who accepted employment with the Agency with the understanding that if they performed properly, they would be able to continue in their profession for their entire working career...."

- o Such policy statements or explanations as he has seen have used words implying a choice on the part of an employee even though Agency expectations were set forth.

Example

25X1A

25X1A

"I have read [REDACTED] very carefully and am considerably puzzled by the semantics therein. I find no statement of a mandatory retirement age/service combination. I do find several rather ambiguous statements.... If I have any understanding of the meaning of words employed in [REDACTED] the actual choice of retiring at ages between 60 and 70 remains with the employee. "Optional," "voluntary" and "encourages" all imply choice. Nowhere is there any statement or implication that employees will be terminated if they do not opt to retire before the mandatory age of 70...."

- o He has had the signals changed on him three times in little over ten years and considers this unfair even if the overall policy is justifiable.

Example

"I am badly confused about the ethical justification for changing the retirement rules so often that personal financial planning is impossible.... You will remember the recruiting talk some of us middle-aged marvels received to convince us in 1948 that Agency service was highly desirable.... We were specifically assured that since 65 was the



retirement age those of us in middle age still had an opportunity to serve in government long enough to get satisfactory retirement compensation.... [Nevertheless] I hasten to say that I'll go quietly and quickly to the nearest Agency exit on my 60th birthday. No one will have to push me but that does not mean that I look with equanimity at any government agency breaking its word not once but twice...."

- o He has had unconscionably short notice to redirect his professional life.

Example

"Only a little over a year ago I received a notice about the desirability of preparing for the retirement that would be all mine at 62. It took the Agency only some 13 months to rescind that order...."

- o He has been penalized the economic advantages of longer service accruing from pay raises designed to provide relief from rising costs of living.

Example

"To retire immediately on reaching my 60th birthday...would face me with extremely heavy financial and personal problems, with which I shall probably be unable to cope without a substantial extension...."

- o He is being deprived of future income in a period when earnings and professional attainment are at their peak and when college costs for dependents may still be an important consideration.

Example

"For me, income foregone consists of that income which I have expected to earn from Agency employment between the ages of 61 and 65--or, after state and federal taxes, about \$75,000. What does the Agency offer

to the employee in return for this income which it expects him to forego? If the employee qualifies under the CIA Retirement System he receives an incentive in the form of higher annuity accumulation rates. This incentive to early retirement amounts in effect to an annuity service credit of 1.75 years. The Agency employee who retires early under the Civil Service Retirement System receives no such annuity credit or other material inducement for his potential income foregone."

- o He also foregoes annuity income.

Example

"It will be said that in lieu of income foregone, the early retiree attains more rapid access to his annuity, and that its effective value is enhanced because he will draw on it for a longer period of time than if he retired at a later date. True, but in retiring early, the employee also foregoes annuity income. If I retire after 20 years of Agency service I become eligible for 36.25% of an average income of about \$24,000, which will yield an annuity (with survivor benefits) of around \$8,100. I thus forego four years of annuity accrual as compared with retirement at age 65. Were I to retire at age 65, at the same salary level, ignoring in-grade increases, promotions, or general salary increases, my annuity would rise to \$9,800, a gain of more than 20 percent. Viewed in terms of income foregone, early retirement thus deprives the individual in my category of one-fifth of the anticipated annuity at the normal retirement age of 65."

- o He foregoes the opportunity to provide additional annuity for himself from anticipated savings during his terminal years of employment.

Example

"Suppose, instead of foregoing income the employee follows the prudent course of saving some 20% of his salary after taxes. Converted into private annuity this sum should be worth about \$500 a year in annuity benefits for each year worked in a senior grade beyond the age 60 and up to the age of 65. Now this sum just about equals the amount of additional Civil Service Retirement earned during each of these years."

- o He views as unrealistic the Agency assumption that private industry has a ready job for the early retiree who must continue to work.

Examples

"Except for transfer to other government service in lieu of retirement, a prospect which diminishes rapidly after 60, the prospects are dim. In private employment it is necessary to work for 40 quarters or ten years to qualify for minimum social security coverage. Few retirement plans in private industry will accept a short timer with less than five years of expected contributions."

"Since the receipt of your memorandum, I have been alert to every opportunity for durable and gainful employment which would maintain approximately the level of my present net income and thus avoid financial distress following retirement.... Unfortunately, none of these discussions was fruitful. Either by reason of company policy as to age, or lack of suitable qualifications for the job openings where age is not a factor, or because of long identification with the Agency, the persons with whom I talked could offer no promise of employment in any category."

- o He has had the flexibility of deciding his own future--left to other Federal employees--taken away.

Examples

"I am at present concerned with these matters of principle, and with discovering what the effective rights of career service employees are, rather than inquiring about appeals procedures for individuals or special exceptions for hardship cases."

"I wish to strongly protest this decision as it is a violation of my constitutional and basic legal rights."

How much resentment has actually built up, how much this affects output, how much will persist after retirement itself, and what repercussions this might have on the Agency's image or our ability to recruit, are all matters of conjecture. It is easy enough to see some resulting harm, but how significant is this when offset by the revitalizing effects early retirement is designed to produce? None can truly answer this question.

We can say that the most serious effects on employee morale will be short-run. The passage of time will altogether eliminate some of the causes of discontent enumerated above. The effect of other causes will be mitigated if only because all employees will have lived under the new dispensation longer.

APPENDIX A

Background to Problems of Administering  
CIA Retirement Policy Under Civil Service

BACKGROUND TO PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTERING  
CIA RETIREMENT POLICY UNDER CIVIL SERVICE\*

25X1A In 1953 the Agency confirmed in regulatory issuance the policy adhered to since its beginnings: "CIA would effect the retirement of eligible employees in accordance with the spirit and purposes of the Civil Service Retirement Act...." This policy continued in force for a number of years, during which many individuals were hired, some in mid-career, with full assurance that they could plan their futures on the basis of this policy [REDACTED] 21 December 1963).

25X1A Late 1959 brought a shift away from that policy to one of encouraging employees to retire well in advance of the statutory limit of the Federal Government. In contrast to the mandatory age of 70, CIA employees were expected to so plan their lives that those having 30 years of Federal service at age 60 would then retire, while any one having less than 30 but more than five years of service would retire at 62. The Agency notice announcing this was dated 5 January 1960; the Headquarters Regulation [REDACTED] was dated 3 November 1961.

The new policy was proposed and pressed by the Clandestine Services on grounds of need for a younger, more vigorous service than would have been possible under normal Civil Service practice in the Government generally.

In the interest of having a single policy within the Agency, the other directorates accepted the DDP proposal though they had no compelling requirement for its provisions. In recognition of this variation in need deputy directors were delegated authority to waive the policy in individual cases, and waivers were in fact liberally granted.

25X1A On 27 July 1964, as one means of adjusting the Agency's strength to projected levels, the Executive Director directed that exceptions "be granted only when an employee's skills are truly irreplaceable from within the Agency or when a real financial hardship would result which would materially affect the employee's ability to maintain the necessities of life"

\*Excerpt from [REDACTED] memo to Chairman, Retirement Board, 14 August 1967.

25X1A

(Action Memo [REDACTED]. In the face of this directive, many supervisors logically concluded that no man is irreplaceable and recommended no waivers on grounds of operational necessity. Others equated operational convenience with irreplaceability in granting extensions. Where the individual felt aggrieved and the deputy did not recommend his retention, recourse was to the Agency Retirement Board, created to enhance the chances of a uniform application of Agency policy in hardship cases.

25X1A

The rigors of the Agency policy, as reflected in Action Memo [REDACTED] were almost at once partially blunted by the action of the Executive Director in a case representative of others. In a memorandum dated 24 August 1964 to its Chairman, the Agency Retirement Board was directed to extend for at least three years an employee with a 17 year tenure who was scheduled to retire at age 62. The reasons given were:

- . Need for a humane and judicious application of policy where individuals have entered on duty late in life;
- . Careful regard to any commitments, precise or implied, oral or in writing.

The Executive Director noted that it was "particularly important that we not force these people to retire unless they are willing, when it is difficult if not impossible for them, to return to their former professions or to acquire other commensurate employment." Attempts to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between these actions were on grounds that exceptions covered by the 24 August memo were likely to be very few indeed.

The application of new Agency policy proceeded with reasonable success. Until July 1967, not one employee due to retire under it failed to, though on a number of occasions delays occurred, and persistent persuasion if not insistence were required to secure compliance. Evidence of compliance in these cases takes the form of the employee signing a request to retire (CSC 2801).

Meanwhile CIA successfully pursued a parallel course of action to secure special legislation to deal with the problem of the Clandestine Services. In October 1964, the Congress,

at Agency urging, passed PL 88-643, an act for the retirement of certain CIA employees, largely those whose overseas service, or some equivalent, would entitle them to preferred retirement treatment similar to that accorded to Foreign Service Officers. Barring extension by the Director, members of this special retirement system are to retire at age 60, though there are options exercisable by the employee for earlier retirement.

Despite this favorable legislation, estimated eventually to affect the careers of perhaps one-fourth CIA employees, managers sought further relief through early retirement. Many in the DDP are not and will never be covered by the CIA Retirement System. DDP and DDS, and to a far lesser extent the DDI and DDS&T, felt the need for opportunities to promote promising mid-careerists if Agency performance was to be improved. The hump created by mid-careerists hired in the expansion of the 1950s, the Bureau of Budget squeeze on super-grade slots, the difficulty of teaching old hands new tricks, all conspired to alert top management to opportunities for additional relief.

Relief came in the form of Federal legislation enacted in 1966 amending the Civil Service Retirement Act. The changes permitted optional retirement without a reduction in annuity at age 55 with 30 years service, and at age 60 with 20 years of service (in addition to the previous provision for retirement at age 62 with five years service).

These provisions were seized upon as a means of narrowing the gap between tenure for those under the Civil Service Retirement System and those under the CIA Retirement System. This was accomplished when, on 23 February 1967, the Director approved the 27 January 1967 memorandum of the Director of Personnel. Follow-up action resulted in relieving the deputy directors of the authority to grant extensions based on the needs of the service. Form letters were sent to all employees within five years of retirement to confirm old or set new dates at which time they were expected to retire.

From the employee's viewpoint several aspects of the Agency's retirement policy have been disconcerting from the outset. For the majority of CIA personnel, the Agency's need to have them retire early has never been convincingly explained



let alone demonstrated. There has been sufficient lack of uniformity in the application of the policy as to raise some eyebrows. The wording of Agency notices and regulations on the subject has left uncertainty regarding the preparedness of the Director to enforce his own policy in the event of employee non-compliance. Where the Director's right to set such a policy was not doubted, uncertainty remained concerning the propriety of changing the rules of the game several times within a period of a few years. Furthermore, there appeared to be an inconsistency between an Agency position at the time of recruiting which stresses Agency adherence to Civil Service standards of pay and benefits, and an Agency position at the time of retirement which stresses the freedom of the DCI from Civil Service imposed standards of retirement in favor of his own.

Why then has there been compliance to the policy until recently? There are a number of reasons. First, recognizing the Director's special powers under the Agency's organic act, and given a new situation without precedent, people were just reluctant to make a contest in a situation where experience shows the individual pitted against the bureaucracy seldom wins. Second, there was a general sharing of feeling that the Agency is something special, that the Clandestine Services had a special problem, that a uniform policy was defensible if it helped to solve this special problem, and that sufficient flexibility had been given supervisors to seek and obtain waivers in particular cases as to provide adequate protection for the employee. Third, the 60/30 - 62/20 parameters set forth were fairly close to the conditions which many employees set for themselves. Four, some of the employees who have retired were one way or another pressured by management into so doing, often in a degrading manner.

Why are there now such strong indications of resistance to the newly announced policy? The inverse of the points made above of course suggest themselves. Basically the malaise concerning early retirement under Civil Service stems from:

- . A realization that the long range family plans made on the basis of earlier policy would be seriously affected by an acceleration of the date of retirement.

- . A realization that an Agency policy statement which uses words like "option," "eligible," and "expect," does not carry the conviction of mandatory enforcement.
- . A realization that, compassion apart, uniform enforcement of policy makes little sense, when some categories of employees are in short supply and other categories may attain or maintain their highest performance in the twilight of their careers.
- . A realization that the Agency has been granted legislation to deal with its special problems. Hence, why should Agency employees remaining under Civil Service not enjoy all options enjoyed by other Government Civil Service employees?
- . A realization that an Agency position, almost any position, apart from income, provides the individual with certain status. There is an indefinable reluctance to abandon this unless a substitute is provided.
- . A realization that pay raises, in the immediate past or prospective, will appreciably improve retirement income only if the employee works long enough to have them fully reflected in his "high five" earning average.

## APPENDIX B

### Retirement Policy and Practice

- . Retirement Systems in CIA
- . Federal Civil Service Retirement System
- . Foreign Service Retirement System
- . Uniformed Services Retirement System
- . Policy in Government Supported Research Organizations
- . University Practice
- . Corporate Practice

# RETIREMENT SYSTEMS IN CIA

CIA employees belong to one of two basic retirement systems, either the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARS). The Civil Service system has existed since 1920 and its membership constitutes most of the employees of the Federal Government. The CIA system came into being as a result of Agency initiative with the passage of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees.

From the employee's viewpoint, the essential differences between the CSRS and the CIARS at the time of its passage lay in the options available to management and to the employee concerning retirement age and the amount of retirement pay.

By passing the Federal Employees Salary Act of 1966, the Congress narrowed the differences in retirement options.

And when in February 1967, the Director modified the Agency's retirement policy by adopting the new employee options of the Act of 1966, the differences between retirement under the CIA system and the CS system as administered by the Agency were even more considerably diminished, as the representation below shows:

	<u>CIA System</u>	<u>Civil Service in CIA</u>	<u>Civil Service Elsewhere</u>
Employee Options:	50/20	55/30	55/30 60/20 62/5 70/x
Management Options:	50/20 x/25 60/x 65/x	60/20 62/5 70/x	70/x

No change has been made in the basis for calculating retirement pay under the CIARS and the CSRS. The difference is in the multiplier applied to the average high five years of pay, resulting in a difference of 3 3/4% in favor of the retirement pay of members of the CIA system.

A source of apprehension, partly justified and partly based on misinformation, is the impact of retirement upon insurance coverage provided by Agency programs.

On retirement, with 12 or more years of service, FEGLI coverage remains in force free of premiums. Coverage is reduced at age 65, whether or not the individual is still on the job or is retired, at the rate of 2% per month down to a minimum base of 25% of the original coverage.

The UBLIC program provides coverage at 50¢ per month per \$1,000 until age 60, whether or not the individual has retired. After age 60, coverage is reduced to 1/6 of the average coverage of the last ten years until age 70, at which time it is reduced to 1/12.

The WAEPA program provides that on retirement or at age 65, whichever comes first, the individual may retain 1/3 of his original coverage at a cost of \$30 per year per \$1,000. Premiums prior to age 65 are \$13.10 per month for \$16,250 of basic coverage.

Thus early retirement has no practical effect upon coverage provided by FEGLI or UBLIC.

However, retirement before age 65 materially affects WAEPA protection, reducing it by 2/3 with no reduction in cost.

## FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Until recently normal retirement under Civil Service in the Government generally was under two employee options: age 62 with at least five years service or age 60 with at least 30 years. About  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times as many retire under the 62-5 provision as do under the 60-30 option. (This ratio is down from more than two to one a year earlier.)

The average age of recent 62-5 retirees was 66 years; the average service, 21 years. The 60-30 retirees averaged 65 years of age and had 37 years of service. Overall average age of normal retirees was 65.7, average service 25.6 years.

In 1966, Congress liberalized retirement provisions so that optional retirement is now possible without penalty at 55 with 30 years service, at 60 with 20 or at 62 with five. The legislation is too recent to have yielded any useful statistics on how it may affect retirement patterns, although we do know that 6% of FY 1965 retirements were under the 55-30 option then in force under which the income of the retiree was reduced 1% for each year that he was short of 60 years of age.

The compulsory retirement age under Civil Service remains 70. And attempts by the Administration to get a two-way 55-30 option was rejected by Congress. In other words, Congress gave the employee the right to retire at 55 with 30 years of service, but refused to give management the right to retire involuntarily an employee meeting these conditions.

## FOREIGN SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM

In the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System, after which the CIA system was patterned, retirement is mandatory at age 60 (except for career ambassadors and career ministers who retire at 65).

Age 60 was set

"in recognition of the need to maintain the Foreign Service as a corps of highly qualified individuals with the necessary physical stamina and intellectual vitality to perform effectively at any of some 300 posts throughout the world including those in isolated, primitive or dangerous areas. Retirement at 60 also enhances the advancement opportunities of the most effective younger personnel and reduces the strain on the selection-out program."

Voluntary retirement on full annuity is authorized at or after age 50 with 20 or more years. Officers making most use of this provision are those whose careers have leveled out.

This system includes a provision for selection-out, i.e., the enforced retirement or separation of FSOs below the class of career minister who either remain in class without promotion for a specified period or fail to maintain the standard of performance required of officers in their class.

[Note: Under this system, a bright FSO promoted early, but who may therefore spend more time in a higher class, will be pushed out of the service altogether. On the other hand, his plodding running mate, who lingers in each class for a maximum length of time, then barely makes the promotion list, will not be retired as early.]

## UNIFORMED SERVICES RETIREMENT SYSTEM

The military retirement system places primary emphasis on the maintenance of a young and vigorous force capable of performing vital defense and combat missions. For officers, this system is closely integrated with an up-or-out selective promotion system. Officers passed over for promotion two consecutive times are forced to retire (if they have 20 years or more of service), or are discharged with a readjustment payment (if they have under 20 years service).

The practical effect of this is the retirement of all officers beginning with majors (as they attain 20 years of service) through general officers (as they attain 35 years of service). Most officers would therefore find themselves retired between the ages of 40 and 55, with 50 being the most likely age.

The involuntary separation provisions are complemented by provisions which permit voluntary retirement of members who have at least 20 years of service. This is a privilege, not a right, the exercise of which depends upon the approval of the respective Departmental Secretaries.

In addition, maximum age limits are imposed. Ages 60 or 62, varying by department and depending primarily upon grade, are the generally prescribed statutory limits for retention of male officers (50 or 55 for some female officers). Strictly controlled exceptions may extend some to 64. And others, such as doctors, lawyers and chaplains, who would otherwise be retired prior to age 60 based on grade and service, may be extended to age 60.



## POLICY IN GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS

Many organizations, entirely or largely supported by Government contracts, engage in research and analysis similar to the work of the Agency's production offices. Indeed some of these are in direct competition with CIA for these skills.

Illustrative of these institutions is the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) which is under contract to the U.S. Army. RAC's retirement policy provides as follows:

"Your Normal Retirement Date is the first day of the month on or following your 65th birthday.

"You may retire as early as age 55 if you have then completed 15 years of Credited Service or if you are determined to be permanently disabled by RAC....

"You may continue in active service beyond your Normal Retirement Date only with the consent of RAC.... Your retirement income will begin when you actually retire in the same amount which would have been payable at your Normal Retirement Date."

## UNIVERSITY PRACTICE

Retirement plans in American colleges are administered by three types of systems: the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA)--College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) program, State Teachers and Public Employee programs and the Agency Life Insurance Company retirement programs. All these are for the most part supplemented by Social Security coverage.

The most authoritative general pronouncement on retirement policy is the statement made in 1957 by the Joint Committee of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the Association of American Colleges (AAC). This group recommended a fixed and relatively late retirement age, stating that "the desirable fixed retirement age would appear to be from 67 to 70."

The most widely used system in colleges today specifies a normal retirement age of 65 with extensions granted to age 70.

In some cases, where extensions, say beyond 65 or 68, are granted, the work schedule is reduced to half time.

There are indications that retirement for administrators may increasingly be earlier than for teachers. In some of these cases the administrator continues on as teacher after relinquishing administrative responsibilities.

Another approach is to appoint individuals to administrative posts for a given period--say four years. On completion of this tour, the individual is either extended or returned to faculty status. This can easily become normally accepted practice.

## CORPORATE PRACTICE

Retirement policy and practice among private corporations have been largely related to the Social Security program. Hence the compulsory age of retirement is in most cases 65. And the preferred minimum early retirement age is 60.

Many companies have different policies for salaried and hourly employees, and some differentiate between men and women. Where these differing practices are in force, salaried employees have much less opportunity to work after 65 than hourly workers, and women have an earlier retirement age than men--with accelerations from three to ten years.

The trend over the last ten years has been toward more restrictive policies, that is, in the direction of lowering the age of compulsory retirement, although on occasion a company has moved in the other direction.

A small number of corporations allow all employees to work after 65, regardless of ability and willingness. At the other extreme an equally small number enforce compulsory retirement at 65 in the strict sense: everyone must retire at 65, including those who perform outstandingly.

Many companies allow exceptions to the compulsory rule. Some of these require retirement unless asked by management to stay on, with perhaps an annual review on a case by case basis.

Early retirement, that is, under age 65, is still an exceptional occurrence in most companies. The right to early retirement is increasingly less subject to company consent, but left as an option which the employee may chose to exercise.

The majority of companies provide postretirement life insurance and pay the entire premium. The preretirement coverage however is reduced on retirement. Postretirement health insurance coverage is just as widespread, though only about one third of the companies bear the full cost.

Preretirement counseling programs and various schemes to help employees taper off, experiment with the use of increase in leisure time, and generally adjust, are widespread.

## APPENDIX C

### Supporting Tables


- I. DDI Recent Separations
- II. DDI Retirement Performance
- III. DDI Personnel Whose Retirement Was Recently Accelerated by Change in Agency Policy and Who Had Less Than 5 Years Notice
- IV. DDI Retirement Projections

I. DDI RECENT SEPARATIONS

Intelligence Career Separations over age 40  
(Fiscal Year 1962-67)



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INTELLIGENCE CAREER SEPARATIONS  
OVER AGE 40 BY CAUSE  
(FY 1962 - 1967)

Cause	Number	Annual Average	% T/O***
Resignations*	172	28	
Death	28	5+	
Retirement	167	28-	
CSC Optional	95	16	
Discontinued Service	8	1	
Disability	54	9	
**CIA Retirement System	10	2	
Total True Separations	367	61	

\* Includes 20 identifiable as separated for unsatisfactory service.

25X9 \*\* Includes 3 voluntary, 4 mandatory age and 3 disability.

25X9 \*\*\* T/O of  used throughout, of which  are over 40 years of age.

INTELLIGENCE CAREER SEPARATIONS  
OVER AGE 40: FY 1962 - 1967

---

Median age of separation:	55
Resignation	49
Death	59
Retirement	62
Age of highest incidence:	
Resignation	48
Death	64
Retirement	63
Average annual separations by grade:	
Supergrades	4
GS - 15	4.5
GS - 14	7
GS - 13	8
GS - 12	8
GS - 11	5.5
GS - 9/10	9
GS - 7/8	5
Under GS - 7	10

Trend: Number of separations doubled over period  
of 6 years (from 38 to 81).

INTELLIGENCE CAREER SEPARATIONS  
 OVER AGE 40 BY GRADE  
 (FY 1962 - 1967)

GRADE	YEAR						TOTAL
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	
18	2	2	1		4	1	10
17	1	1	1			1	4
16	1	3		3	2		9
15	2	2	3	4	8	8	27
14	5	5	8	6	9	8	41
13	5	7	3	12	10	11	48
12	8	6	4	7	13	9	47
11	1	4	7	7	11	9	39
10	2	2		3	1	1	9
09	6	8	6	7	1	15	43
08		1	3	4		1	9
07	2	7	2	3	5	2	21
SUBTOTAL	35	48	38	56	64	66	307
06		1	3	2	5	7	18
05	3	4	2	6	4	4	23
04		2	3	2	5	3	15
03		1	1				2
02				1			1
01						1	1
SUBTOTAL	3	8	9	11	14	15	60
TOTAL	38	56	47	67	78	81	367

Equivalents used: GP 99 equals GS - 11  
 CF 2 10 " GS - 10  
 CF 1 " GS - 2  
 W 07 " GS - 1



INTELLIGENCE CAREER SEPARATIONS  
 OVER AGE 40 BY COMPONENT  
 (FY 1962 - 1967)

COMPONENT	YEAR						TOTAL
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	
DDI	3	1	1	2	5	1	13
OCI	2	9	4	6	3	5	29
OER	10	10	16	15	15	6	72
OSR							
OBI	1	4			7	13	25
NPIC/ IAS	5	4	2	6	3	5	25
CRS	8	13	14	18	20	30	103
DCS	3	7	5	11	14	12	52
██████	5	7	4	9	10	8	43
SUBTOTAL	37	55	46	67	77	80	362
ONE	1	1	1		1	1	5
TOTAL	38	56	47	67	78	81	367

STATSPEC

INTELLIGENCE CAREER SEPARATIONS  
 OVER AGE 40 BY DATE OF BIRTH  
 (FY 1962 - 1967)

DATE OF BIRTH	TYPE			TOTAL
	RESIGNATION	DEATH	RETIREMENT	
1900		1	19	20
1	1	1	11	13
2	1	1	10	12
3		4	19	23
4	3	1	22	26
5	2	1	13	16
6	4	2	7	13
7	4	1	7	12
8	6	3	4	13
9	4	2	6	12
1910	4	1	6	11
11	5	2	5	12
12	3		7	10
13	3	2	3	8
14	8		1	9
15	11		4	15
16	6		5	11
17	8	1	3	12
18	14		2	16
19	19	1		20
1920	14		2	16
21	14		2	16
22	14	1	2	17
23	9	1	2	12
24	4		3	7
25	5	2	1	8
26	6		1	7
TOTAL	172	28	167	367

DDI PROFESSIONAL EODs  
 (FY 1963-1967)

Component	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
ODDI/IRS	1					1
OCI	23	13	6	4	8	54
OER/OSR	73	38	23	38	63	235
OBGI	12	2		8	15	37
NPIC/IAS	120	84	49	129	78	460
CRS	79	43	11	56	60	249
DCS	1	1			3	5
STATSPEC	50*	23*	2	3	11	89
ONE	1		2	2	2	7
TOTAL	360	204	93	240	240	1137
STATSPEC						

\*NOTE:

[REDACTED]

### DDI ATTRITION AMONG PROFESSIONAL EODs (FY 1963-1967)

Component	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
ODDI/IRS						
OCI	12	5				17
OER/OSR	39	22	10	10	11	92
OEGI	4	1		2	3	10
NPIC/IAS	44	28	11	29	21	133
CRS	43	28	4	15	16	106
DCS					1	1
████████	26*	13*	1	1	2	43
ONE			1	1	2	4
TOTAL	168	97	27	58	56	406

**\*NOTE:**

STATSPEC

## II. DDI RETIREMENT PERFORMANCE

- A. Number of DDI retirees  
(Fiscal Year 1962-67)
  - 1. By age and year 55
  - 2. By grade and year 56
- B. Performance in retiring personnel on schedule  
(Calendar 1967)
  - By component and ratio of extensions  
to retirements on schedule 57
- C. Current DDI cases granted CIA Retirement Board  
extensions (grade - component - age/service -  
months extended) 58

NUMBER OF DDI RETIREES BY AGE  
 (FY 62 - 67)

Age	Year						Total
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	
Under 55		1			1	2	4
55							5
56	1		1	2	2	2	4
57		1			2		3
58		1			1	1	3
59					1	2	3
60				2	1	6	9
61					3	1	4
62		6	7	9	13	19	54
63			2	1		1	4
64				7	1	3	11
65				1	4		5
Over 65						1	1
Total	1	9	10	22	30	38	110

NUMBER OF DDI RETIREES BY GRADE  
 (FY 62 - 67)

Grade	Year						Total
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	
04		1			1		2 )
05			2		1	1	7 )
06				3	1	4	5 )
07				1	2		3 )
08				2			2 )
09	1	1	1	4	1	8	16 )
10					1	1	2 )
11		3	2	2	3	3	13 )
12		1		1	3	6	11 )
13					5	3	11 )
14			1	2	6	6	16 )
15		1	2	2	2	4	11 )
16		1		1	1		3 )
17			1			1	2 )
18		1			4	1	6 )
Total	1	9	10	22	30	38	110

DDI PERFORMANCE IN RETIRING  
 PERSONNEL ON SCHEDULE  
 (CALENDAR 1967)

COMPONENT	NUMBER ELIGIBLE	RETIRED ON SCHEDULE	NUMBER EXTENDED	RATIO EXTENDED
ODDI*				
OCI	2	1	1	50
OER	2	2		0
OSR				
OBGI	3	2	1	33
NPIC	2	1	1	50
IAS				
CRS	15**	8	7	47
DCS	12	6	6	50
STATSPEC	2		2	100
TOTAL	38	20	18***	47

NOTE: Where employee is scheduled to leave by end of year, and no reason is known why this will not happen, he is included in total of those retired.

- \* One not scheduled to retire was retired as surplus.
- \*\* Plus 1 retired for disability, and another as surplus.
- \*\*\* Four were extended only very short times (2, 2, 4 and 6 months respectively) and are retiring at end of 1967.



CURRENT CASES GRANTED  
 RETIREMENT BOARD EXTENSIONS

STATSPEC

CASE #	GRADE	COMPONENT	AGE/SERVICE	EXTENSION (Months)
1	18	[REDACTED]	60/30	18
2	15	DCS	62/23	7
3	14	NPIC	65/25	12
4	14	DCS	62/19	2
5	14	DCS	62/17	12
6	14	DCS	61/30	6
7	14	DCS	62/29	11
8	13	OBGI	63/25	6
9	13	DCS	62/17	12
10	13	OCI	62/25	3
11	13	IAS	66/12	12
12	13	[REDACTED]	62/27	5
13	11	[REDACTED]	64/10	23
14	10	[REDACTED]	60/21	7
15	9	[REDACTED]	60/40	6
16	9	DCS	60/34	10
17	7	DCS	67/12	24
18	7	CRS	62/26	5
19	6	CRS	62/14	12
20	6	DCS	65/16	12
21	6	DCS	63/12	12
22	5	CRS	64/18	36
23	5	CRS	65/24	12
24	5	CRS	64/12	12

\*CIARS

ITEM	AVERAGE	MEDIAN	RANGE
Age	62.7 years	62	60-68
Longevity	21.6 years	22	10-40
Extension	12.1 months	12	2-36

III. DDI PERSONNEL WHOSE RETIREMENT WAS RECENTLY ACCELERATED  
BY CHANGE IN AGENCY POLICY AND WHO HAD LESS THAN 5  
YEARS NOTICE

- |  |    |
|--|----|
| A. By grade and number of months of<br>acceleration                  | 60 |
| B. By component and new year of scheduled<br>retirement              | 61 |
| C. By acceleration in months and new year<br>of scheduled retirement | 62 |
| D. By grade and new year of scheduled<br>retirement                  | 63 |

DDI Personnel Whose Retirement  
 Has Been Accelerated And  
 Who Have Had Less Than 5 Years Notice  
 (By Number of Months Accelerated Per Grade)

Grade	Total	Months Accelerated			
		Under 7	7 - 12	13 - 18	19 - 24
4	1		1		
5	10	2	1	2	5
6	5		5		
7	8	1	2		5
8					
9	9	1	1	1	6
10	3	1			2
11	16		3		13
12	20	6	4	2	8
13	16	2	2	4	8
14	15	2		3	10
15	18	1	2	3	12
16	2		2		
17	3	1	1		1
18					
TOTAL	126	17	24	15	70

DDI Personnel Whose Retirement  
 Has Been Accelerated And  
 Who Have Had Less Than 5 Years Notice  
 (By Component)

Component	Total	Year Retirement Re-Scheduled			
		1969	1970	1971	1972
ODDI	3			3	
OCI	10	3	4	2	1
OER	9	4	1	2	2
OSR					
OBI	14	8	4	1	1
NPIC/IAS	5	2	1	1	1
CRS	32	10	10	10	2
DCS	28	5	8	13	2
STATSPEC	25	11	6	7	1
TOTAL	126	43	34	39	10

DDI Personnel Whose Retirement  
 Has Been Accelerated And  
 Who Have Had Less Than 5 Years Notice  
 (By Number of Months Accelerated)

Acceleration (in Months)	Total	Year Retirement Re-Scheduled			
		1969	1970	1971	1972
1	2	1		1	
2					
3	5	1			4
4	7	1	1		5
5	2	1			1
6	1	1			
7	4	2		2	
8	5	2	1	2	
9	3	1	1	1	
10	2	2			
11	4	3		1	
12	6	3	1	2	
13	1			1	
14	2	1	1		
15	2	1	1		
16	4	1		3	
17	4	3		1	
18	2	2			
19	3	2	1		
20	4	1	2	1	
21	5	1	3	1	
22	5	3	1	1	
23	2		1	1	
24	51	10	20	21	
TOTAL	126	43	34	39	10

DDI Personnel Whose Retirement  
 Has Been Accelerated And  
 Who Have Had Less Than 5 Years Notice  
 (By Grade)

Grade	Total	Year Retirement Re-Scheduled			
		1969	1970	1971	1972
18					
17	3	1		2	
16	2			2	
15	18	6	6	5	1
14	15	5	7	3	
13	16	5	3	6	2
12	20	9	3	4	4
11	16	9	3	4	
10	3		3		
9	9	1	3	4	1
8					
7	8	2	2	4	
6	5	3		2	
5	10	1	4	3	2
4	1	1			
TOTAL	126	43	34	39	10

#### IV. DDI RETIREMENT PROJECTIONS

##### A. Personnel scheduled or eligible for retirement over the next ten years (Calendar 1968-77):

1. By retirement system and option	66
2. By component and year	67
3. By grade and year	68
a. ODDI	69
b. IRS	70
c. OCI	71
d. OER	72
e. OSR	73
f. OBGI	74
g. NPIC	75
h. IAS	76
i. CRS	77
j. DCS	78
k. [REDACTED]	79
l. ONE	80

STATSPEC

##### B. Personnel scheduled or eligible for retirement over the next five years (Calendar 1968-72):

By retirement system and professional or clerical designation	81
---	----

C. DDI "no-option" scheduled retirements under Civil Service (Calendar 1968-72):

By longevity and year 82

["No-option" means employee will not have earned enough service to leave at his pleasure before age 60 under the 55/30 provision.]

D. Personnel eligible to accelerate their own retirement within the next ten years by exercising 55/30 option under Civil Service or 50/20 option under CIA system:

By year and component 83



PERSONNEL SCHEDULED OR ELIGIBLE FOR RETIREMENT  
OVER THE NEXT 10 YEARS: CALENDAR 1968-77  
(BY RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND OPTION)

Component	Civil Service Retirement System						CIA Retirement System				Total Eligible
	Over 60	60/20 Only	60/20 With 55/30 Option	Total Scheduled	Early 55/30 Option	Total CSRS Eligible	60 And Over	60 With 50/20 Option	Early 50/20 Option	Total CIARS Eligible	
ODDI		2	3	5	8	13			2	2	15
IRS		8	5	13	11	24		1	1	2	26
OCI	3	19	16	38	31	69		1	3	4	73
OER	10	14	10	34	16	50			1	1	51
OSR	2	4	2	8	9	17					17
OBGI	12	21	21	54	27	81			1	1	82
NPIC	3	22	22	47	41	88			5	5	93
IAS	1	3	1	5	3	8					8
CRS	27	51	41	119	35	154		1		1	155
DCS	20	42	37	99	39	138		3		3	141
██████	20	52	31	103	40	143	4	22	39	65	208
ONE	5	5	4	14	3	17		2		2	19
TOTAL	103	243	193	539	263	802	4	30	52	86	888

NOTE: Special cases such as pending disability retirement cases and reserve appointments not included. As of 1 Jan 68 these totaled 12, including 2 cases of employees who will retire after 31 Dec 77 at over age 60.

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No Foreign Dissem  
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No Foreign Dissem

## STATSPEC

PERSONNEL SCHEDULED OR ELIGIBLE FOR RETIREMENT  
OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS: CALENDAR 1968-77  
(BY COMPONENT AND YEAR)

Component	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	Total		
											S*	E**	S or E
ODDI	0/(1)	0/(0)	0/(0)	0/(2)	2/(2)	1/(2)	0/(1)	0/(2)	0/(1)	2/(2)	5	(13)	15
IRS	0/(1)	0/(0)	0/(1)	2/(0)	0/(2)	1/(2)	2/(3)	5/(4)	2/(0)	2/(5)	14	(18)	26
OCI	1/(1)	3/(0)	4/(2)	2/(3)	3/(7)	2/(3)	4/(10)	7/(5)	5/(14)	8/(6)	39	(51)	73
OER	3/(3)	4/(0)	2/(2)	3/(0)	4/(4)	4/(1)	7/(2)	1/(5)	4/(4)	2/(6)	34	(27)	51
OSR	1/(1)	0/(0)	0/(0)	0/(1)	1/(1)	2/(0)	1/(1)	1/(1)	0/(2)	2/(4)	8	(11)	17
OEGI	7/(4)	10/(0)	6/(2)	3/(5)	4/(4)	4/(6)	3/(3)	8/(9)	8/(7)	1/(9)	54	(49)	82
NPIC	3/(4)	3/(1)	1/(1)	3/(4)	4/(9)	6/(7)	7/(8)	9/(7)	7/(12)	4/(15)	47	(68)	93
IAS	1/(0)	0/(0)	0/(0)	0/(1)	1/(0)	0/(1)	0/(1)	1/(0)	0/(1)	2/(0)	5	(4)	8
CRS	10/(5)	16/(4)	14/(0)	13/(10)	11/(17)	11/(6)	13/(10)	10/(4)	10/(9)	12/(12)	120	(77)	155
DCS	9/(7)	9/(2)	9/(3)	15/(7)	9/(8)	8/(12)	10/(5)	8/(10)	10/(11)	14/(14)	101	(79)	141
██████	14/(25)	17/(8)	10/(11)	14/(12)	8/(17)	11/(15)	19/(11)	18/(19)	9/(8)	9/(6)	129	(132)	208
ONE	4/(1)	1/(1)	0/(1)	0/(0)	0/(1)	2/(1)	3/(0)	1/(3)	1/(0)	4/(1)	16	(9)	19
*Scheduled	53	63	46	55	47	52	69	69	56	62	572		
**Eligible	(53)	(16)	(23)	(45)	(72)	(56)	(55)	(69)	(69)	(80)		(538)	
S or E													888

NOTE: Scheduled and Eligible are not mutually exclusive categories. Some individuals will be both eligible and scheduled during this period.

No Foreign Dissem  
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No Foreign Dissem

PERSONNEL SCHEDULED FOR RETIREMENT  
 OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS: CALENDAR 1968-77  
 (BY GRADE AND YEAR)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18	5	1			1	3	1	1		1	13
17		1		1		1		3		1	7
16				2	2	1	1	2	3	4	15
16-18	5	2		3	3	5	2	6	3	6	35*
15	6	7	9	5	5	6	13	6	8	7	72
14	5	6	10	8	4	2	6	6	4	7	58
13	9	10	4	8	10	9	11	10	7	7	85
13-15	20	23	23	21	19	17	30	22	19	21	215
12	4	10	4	6	5	6	10	13	6	10	74
11	6	12	4	6	5	8	11	8	10	6	76
10		1	3					3	3	1	11
10-12	10	23	11	12	10	14	21	24	19	17	161
9	5	1	4	6	4	4	3	7	3	4	41
8			1		2		1	1	2	1	8
7	5	3	2	7	1	3	5	4	2	5	37
7-9	10	4	7	13	7	7	9	12	7	10	86
6	5	5		3	3	3	2	5	3	2	31
5	2	4	4	3	4	4	2		4	4	31
4	1	2	1		1	2	3		1	2**	13
4-6	8	11	5	6	8	9	7	5	8	8	75
Total	53	63	46	55	47	52	69	69	56	62	572

\*Includes 7 GS-18 members of the Board of National Estimates (4 of which are "scheduled" to retire in 1968, 1 in 1969, 1 in 1973 and 1 in 1974) for purposes of this report only inasmuch as these cases are handled by the Director.

\*\*Includes 1 GS-3.

ODDI: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18					1	1				1	3
17											
16											
15					1						1
14										1	1
13											
12											
11											
10											
09											
08											
07											
06											
05											
04											
Total					2	1				2	5

Average per year: 0.5

Range : 0 - 2

IRS: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18											
17											
16								1		1	2
15							1		1		2
14											
13				2		1		1	1		5
12							1				1
11								1			1
10											
09								1			1
08											
07										1	1
06								1			1
05											
04											
Total				2		1	2	5	2	2	14

Average per year: 1.4

Range : 0 - 5

OCI: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18											
17		1									1
16				1	1		1	1	1	1	6
15		1	2			1	2	5	3		14
14			1	1						3	5
13			1		1		2		1	2	7
12	1				1						2
11											
10										1	1
09										1	1
08											
07								1			1
06		1				1					2
05											
04											
Total	1	3	4	2	3	2	5	7	5	8	40

Average per year: 4

Range : 1 - 8

OER: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18											
17						1					1
16				1							1
15	1	2		1		1	2		1		8
14		1		1	1						3
13	1		1		2			1		1	6
12		1	1				2		2		6
11						1				1	2
10											
09					1						1
08							1		1		2
07							1				1
06						1					1
05											
04	1						1				2
Total	3	4	2	3	4	4	7	1	4	2	34

Average per year: 3.4

Range : 1 - 7

OSR: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18											
17											
16											
15	1				1	1				1	4
14											
13											
12											
11											
10											
09						1					1
08											
07										1	1
06								1			1
05											
04											
Total	1				1	2		1		2	7

Average per year: 0.7

Range : 0 - 2



SECRET  
No Foreign Dissem  
OBGI: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
(CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18						1					1
17								1			1
16									2		2
15	1	2	1			1	1	1			7
14	1	2	3					1	1		8
13	2	2	1		2	1		1	1	1	11
12		2			1	1		2	1		7
11								1	2		3
10			1					1			2
09	2	1		1			1				5
08											
07	1			1			1				3
06		1		1	1						3
05									1		1
04											
Total	7	10	6	3	4	4	3	8	8	1	54

Average per year: 5.4

Range : 1 - 10

SECRET  
 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-00947A000100050001-6  
 No Foreign Dissem  
 NPIC: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18								1			1
17											
16											
15			1			1			2	1	5
14	1	1		1	1		4	1	1		10
13	1	1		1		1			2	1	7
12	1			1			1		1	1	5
11						1		1	1		3
10								1			1
09								1		1	2
08					1			1			2
07		1				1		2			4
06							1	1			2
05					2	2					4
04							1				1
Total	3	3	1	3	4	6	7	9	7	4	47

Average per year: 4.7

Range : 1 - 9

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18											
17											
16					1						1
15											
14									1		1
13	1							1			2
12											
11									1		1
10											
09											
08											
07											
06											
05											
04											
Total	1				1			1		2	5

Average per year: 0.5

Range : 0 - 2

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CRS: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
(CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18											
17								1			1
16											
15	1	2	1				1			1	6
14			1		1	1		2			5
13		2		1		3	2	1			9
12		2	1	1	1		1	1	1	2	10
11	1	3	1	3	2	2	3	1		1	17
10											
09			4	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	15
08											
07	4	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	18
06	3				1	1	1	2	2	1	11
05	1	4	3	3	1	1	2		3	3	21
04		2	1		1	1			1	1	7
Total	10	16	14	13	11	11	13	10	10	12	120

Average per year: 12

Range : 10 - 16

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DCS: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18											
17				1						1	2
16											
15	2		2	2	3	1	2			3	15
14	3	1	5	4		1		2	2	1	19
13	1	3		3	3	3	5	3	2	2	25
12		1	1		1	1	1	3	1	3	12
11		1					2		1	1	5
10									2		2
09	1			1					1		3
08					1	1				1	3
07		1		1						1	3
06	2	2		2					1	1	8
05					1	1					2
04											
Total	9	9	8	14	9	8	10	8	10	14	99

Average per year: 9.9

Range : 8 - 14

STATSPEC  
 SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18	1										1
17											
16						1					1
15			1	2			3		1		7
14		1		1	1		2			1	6
13	3	2	1	1	2		2	2			13
12	2	4	1	4	1	3	4	7		3	29
11	5	8	3	3	3	4	6	4	6	3	45
10		1	2					1	1		5
09	2					1		4	1		8
08			1								1
07				3		1	1				5
06		1			1						2
05	1		1							1	3
04						1	1			1*	3
Total	14	17	10	14	8	11	19	18	9	9	129

Average per year: 12.9

Range : 8 - 19

\*GS-3 included as GS-4 for convenience.

ONE: SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS  
 (CALENDAR 1968-77)

Grade	Year										Total
	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	
18	4	1				1	1				7*
17								1			1
16										2	2
15							1			1	2
14											
13											
12						1					1
11											
10											
09							1			1	2
08									1		1
07											
06											
05											
04											
Total	4	1				2	3	1	1	4	16

Average per year: 1.6

Range : 0 - 4

\*Members of Board of National Estimates serve at the pleasure of the Director, and hence may or may not retire as shown above.

DDI RETIREMENT CASES  
(CALENDAR 1968-1972 BY RETIREMENT SYSTEM)

Component	Civil Service System			CIA System			Total		
	Prof	Clerical	Total	Prof	Clerical	Total	Prof	Clerical	Total
ODDI	3	-	3	2	-	2	5	-	5
IRS	4	1	5	1	-	1	5	1	6
OCI	23	-	23	3	-	3	26	-	26
OER	19	4	23	-	-	-	19	4	23
OSR	3	1	4	-	-	-	3	1	4
OBGI	32	9	41	-	-	-	32	9	41
NPIC	18	9	27	2	-	2	20	9	29
IAS	3	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	3
CRS	49	43	92	1	-	1	50	43	93
DCS	55	16	71	3	-	3	58	16	74
ONE	65	7	72	51	-	51	116	7	123
ONE	7	-	7	2	-	2	9	-	9
TOTAL	281	90	371	65	-	65	346*	90	436

\*Includes 21 Technical and 11 Commo.

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DDI NO-OPTION SCHEDULED RETIREMENTS UNDER CIVIL SERVICE  
(CALENDAR 1968-1972 BY YEARS OF SERVICE)

Component	Under 25 Years					25-29 Years					30 or More Yrs					Annual Totals					Component Totals
	68	69	70	71	72	68	69	70	71	72	68	69	70	71	72	68	69	70	71	72	
ODDI																					
IRS				1						1									2		2
OCI					1	1	3	4	2	2						1	3	4	2	3	13
OER	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2						2	4	2	2	3	13
OSR					1															1	1
OBTI	1	3	1	1	1	4	4	3	1	1	2	3			2	7	10	4	2	4	27
NPIC			1		1	1	3		1	1	1					2	3	1	1	2	9
IAS	1															1				1	2
CRS	5	9	3	6	2	4	6	8	5	4	1	1			1	10	16	11	11	7	55
DCS	5	5	3	2	3	1	4	6		2	3			11	2	9	9	9	13	7	47
ONE	2	7	3	4	2	6	9	4	6	1	2				1	10*	16	7	10	4	47
	1					3	1									4	1				5
Annual	16	27	12	15	12	21	31	26	17	14	9	4		11	6	46	62	38	43	32	
Under 25					82																
25-29										109											
30 or more															30						
Total	STATSPEC					STATSPEC															221

\*In addition 3 [REDACTED] members of CIARS.

EMPLOYEES WHO COULD ACCELERATE THEIR  
 RETIREMENT WITHIN THE NEXT 10 YEARS  
 BY EXERCISING THE 55/30 OR 50/20 OPTION

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Year Eligible	Number by Component										Total
	ODDI	OCI	OER	OSR	OBI	NPIC	IAS	CRS	DCS	ONE	
1968	2	1	3	1	4	4		5	7	25	53
1969						1		4	2	8	16
1970	1	2	2		2	1			3	11	23
1971	2	3		1	5	4	1	10	7	12	45
1972	4	7	4	1	4	9		17	8	17	72
1973	4	3	1		6	7	1	6	12	15	56
1974	4	10	2	1	3	8	1	10	5	11	55
1975	6	5	5	1	9	7		4	10	19	69
1976	1	14	4	2	7	12	1	9	11	8	69
1977	7	6	6	4	9	15		12	14	6	80
Total	31*	51	27	11	49	68	4	77	79	132	538

\*ODDI 13  
 IRS 18

## APPENDIX D

### References

- . Classified reports (9)
- . Open literature (13)
- . Machine listings (6)

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#### MACHINE LISTINGS

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DDI Staffing Complement--Position Control Register, as of 31 December 1967, OP/RCD Job #140.

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[A machine backup to a manual color coded card file of 888 DDI personnel scheduled or eligible for retirement in the next ten years.]

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